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METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR DETECTING A PROCESS OR ACTIVITY USING 
RECURRENT AND CONVOLUTIONAL 1D NEURAL NETWORKS 
 








Presented herein are techniques that use multiple neural networks and segmentation 
of the traffic to detect the presence of applications or business processes within a noisy 
mixture of network traffic. In addition, the techniques presented herein provide a novel 
way to detect unusual, bad intentioned, and/or malicious activity, which is also a “process”,  
using recurrent and convolutional neural networks. The learning outcome can potentially 




Data is being generated at high volumes, at high velocities, and with veracity by 
many different devices, applications, things, processes, etc.  Conventional approaches to 
analysis of data typically involves collection of the data from the sources using different 
collectors and then storing the data into centralized repositories. In some cases, data may 
be tagged or labeled indicating the source (e.g., device or process of origin). However, 
more often data is not labeled (for various reasons); and subsequently, the relationship 
between the data and its source (process or thing) is not obvious. Similarly, sequences from 
multiple processes are lost in the mix of large repositories full of untagged data. In addition, 
cyber attackers are using techniques for attacking modern applications and "end-to-end 
processes." 
As described further below, the techniques presented herein propose automated and 
smart methods for analyzing data within telemetry collectors to glean knowledge about the 
underlying "processes" and application interactions. By learning about the underlying 
process, it is possible to create a model the describes the "end-to-end process" behavior. 
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This information, in turn, allows the system to recognize bad intentioned and/or malicious 
activity from future data streams. 
Applications, Devices, Things or Processes (collectively and generally referred to 
herein as “processes”) generate sequential data streams (e.g., network flows) in high 
volume. Data Collectors aggregate such sequences of data from multiple source processes 
into a single repository.  In numerous cases, data streams are stored in a repository in a 
"blended" form or with a random mixture of multiple data sequences. In addition, in many 
cases, the elements of the data sequences are not tagged or labeled by the name of the 
source process generating the telemetry data stream.  For example, processes can use the 
same symbols when generating telemetry data.   
The proposed techniques automatically detect the presence of the known 
“processes” in a random mixture of "unlabeled" data sequences.  For example, as shown 





In addition, as shown below in Figure 2, the flow collector captures “network and/or 






As shown, each symbol does not carry any information about the source process 
(i.e., the process from which the symbol was originated).  Therefore, as shown below in 
Figure 3, the collector stores the data from Processes A, B, and C as an unlabeled sequential 
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Figure 4, below, illustrates an application/business Process use case to detect te 





In Figure 4, the symbol "SMBLTJUK" represents conversation 
"152.15.40.215|52.21.9.111|443" (src, dst, dst_port), and it can be part of the traffic from 
different applications or business process.  
Once each of "Business Processes/Applications" are detected and categorized, 
unusual, bad intent, and malicious activity could be identified using recurrent and 
convolutional neural networks.  In addition, a similar approach can be taken to identify any 
potential malicious activity against a network infrastructure and/or telemetry collection 
device (e.g., if the network infrastructure device or collector is compromised). 
Figure 5, below, is an overview diagram illustrating aspects of the techniques 
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 Aspects of the techniques presented herein will be described below with reference 
to four (4) general steps, namely: (1) Learning and Modeling Processes, (2) Generation of 
Training Data, (3) Building a Classification Model, and (4) Detection. 
 
 
Step 1: Learning and Modeling Processes 
As the name suggests, during the learning phase, multiple streams of data sequences 
are collected and aggregated by one or multiple independent collectors into a central place, 




At this step, each process is discovered and modeled as a Stochastic Markov 
process. Each process is described by its flows transitioning matrix and flows 
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Step 2: Generation of Training Data Using  
In the second step, training data is generated using the process models from Step 1, 
above.  For each process, training data may be generated using a 50/50 proportion of 
"Process"/"Non-Process."  A transitional matrix may be used for each discovered process 
to generate 5,000 training data sequences (samples) of the "process" (Traffic).  It may be 
possible to generate 5,000 total training samples from other processes, in order to keep 
50/50 ratio of process/non-process. 
These aspects may also include data augmentation to mix each sample with random 
noise (10-20%).  In on example, a permutation could be repeated ten (10) times.  In the end 
there will be 50,000 samples of the "process" and 50,000 samples of "Non-Process" for 
each process (e.g., repeat the above to generate a test data set for each process).  For 
example, if there are ten (10) discovered processes, there will be 10 Training Data sets and 
10 Test Data Sets. Each Training data set will have 100,000 samples in proportion 50/50 
of "Process"/"Non-Process" 
 
Step 3: Building a Classification Model  
In the third step, a classification model is built using shallow Neural Networks 
(CONV1D or Simple RNN) and the data from step 2, above (i.e., train classification models 
for each process).  Each classification model will classify only one process and provide a 
binary result of whether this is a process or not (One against-all).  As a classification model, 
the techniques presented can use a simple recurrent neural network as well as 
Convolutional 1D models, although more complex recurrent neural networks such as GRU 
or LSTM may not produce better results than simple networks. 
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Step 4: Detection 
A challenge with the use of neural network for the classification is that a neural 
network is trained using samples of the desired Class and samples of Non-Class.  If the 
classification model is to recognize a Process "Cat,” then the model was presented 
thousands of variations of this "Cat" (e.g.,  in one example, samples or "pictures" of traffic 
from the process "Cat" mixed with some noise).  A second model designed to recognize 
only the process "Dog" is trained in a similar manner using thousands of variations of the 
process "Dog.”  If the "Cat" model is presented traffic or "pictures" from process "Cat,” 
then they can be perfectly recognized as "Cat,” with the same result with the "Dog" model 
and process. 
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Moreover, even if pictures with "dog" and "cat" are presented next to each other, 
each model will be able to recognize what it has been trained to recognize (e.g., Model 
"Dog" will recognize "Dog", and Model "Cat" will recognize "Cat").  However, a problem 
arises from the fact that the real-life "pictures" of traffic are random mixtures/blends or 
double/triple/quadruple/etc. exposures of "dogs" and "cats", because collectors can mix the 
traffic. Such a mixed "picture" is neither a "dog" nor a "cat". Therefore neither of the 
models can recognize such mixed images.   Figure 8, below, illustrates examples of this 






To address this issued, the techniques presented herein carved the "picture" of the 
traffic into multiple overlapping segments using a moving window of relatively small size 
and then attempt to classify each segment separately.  These small classifications can then 
be combined as a vote. The main idea behind this is that, if an image or sequence as a whole 
is recognizable as "dog", then the combination of classifications of multiple segments 
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should also be recognizable as "dog".  This idea has been verified and confirmed using 
CONV1D and Simple Recurrent Neural Networks.   Therefore, when there is a mixture, 
the system will try to classify each segment using the classification models, and then 
aggregate. The combined result will give us a distribution of what Signals/Processes where 






When a mixture of sequences of processes A and B are presented, Classifier A will 
detect Process A in 50% of segments, and Classifier B will detect Process B in 50% of 
segments. Each segment is classified as A or B with 70-80% guarantee. In the end the 
detection mechanism will provide an answer that there are two Processes in this traffic, 
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The following provides a series of detailed steps for the proposed solution: 
 
#1 : Segment traffic sequence with overlapping segments, using moving window of 
W_len size and stride(shift) == 1. 
 
#2 : Classify each segment by each RNN_Model or CONV1D_Model 
p[3,2] : probability of Classifying Segment2 as Process3 by Neural Network RNN_Model3 
 Seg1 Seg2 Seg3Seg4Seg5Seg6Seg7 Seg8Seg9 
Process1 p[1,1] p[1,2]  0.45   0.745  p[1,9]
Process2 p[2,1] p[2,2]  0.8   0.75  p[2,9]
Process3 p[3,1] p[3,2]  0.81   0.3  p[3,9]
Process4 p[4,1] p[4,2]  0.47   0.56  p[4,9]
 
#3 : Apply credibility level threshold 0.75 (Configurable) 
C_level = 0.75 
If p[i,j] <= C_level then p[i,j] = 0 , then want the Classification Model to have 
high level of confidence. 
 Seg1 Seg2 Seg3Seg4Seg5Seg6Seg7Seg8Seg9 
Process1 p[1,1] p[1,2]  0   0  p[1,9]
Process2 p[2,1] p[2,2]  0.8   0  p[2,9]
Process3 p[3,1] p[3,2]  0.81   0  p[3,9]
Process4 p[4,1] p[4,2]  0   0  p[4,9]
 
#4 : Calculate ARGMAX, which process gives the highest probability to each 
segment 
If ALL probabilities are Zero, then assign Zero to argmax. 
 Seg1 Seg2 Seg3Seg4Seg5Seg6Seg7Seg8Seg9 
Process1 p[1,1] p[1,2]  0   0  p[1,9]
Process2 p[2,1] p[2,2]  0.8   0  p[2,9]
Process3 p[3,1] p[3,2]  0.81   0  p[3,9]
Process4 p[4,1] p[4,2]  0   0  p[4,9]
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#5 : Mark <UNKNOWN> or undetectable segments 
If argmax(i) == 0 then Seg[i] == <UNKN> 
Hypothetical argmax(i): 
 Seg1 Seg2 Seg3Seg4Seg5Seg6Seg7 Seg8Seg9 
Process1 p[1,1] p[1,2]  0   0  p[1,9] 
Process2 p[2,1] p[2,2]  0.8   0  p[2,9] 
Process3 p[3,1] p[3,2]  0.81   0  p[3,9] 
Process4 p[4,1] p[4,2]  0   0  p[4,9] 
argmax(seg) 2 2 3 3 2 3 <UNKN> 3 1 
 
#6 : Calculate distribution of detectible processes 
Using argmax(seg): 
2 2 3 3 2 3 <UNKN> 3 1 
Calculate distribution of classification outcomes: 
1 2 3 <UNKN> 
0.11111110.33333330.44444440.1111111
 
#7 : Make conclusion(s)  
Excluding <UNKN> segments, conclude : 
1. Top One Process : Process 3 
2. Top Two Processes : Process 3 and 2 
3. There is trace of presence of Process 1, but it is too small to be considered. 
4. Process 4 is not detected at all. 
 
It is highly probable that data is generated by the Processes 2 and 3 out of four possible 
processes.  By performing these classification outcomes, unusual processes, bad intentions, 
and malicious activity could also be detected.  If these learning methodologies are applied, 
they could also be used to verify and perform attestation of abnormal behavior in network 
infrastructure devices and collectors (in the case that a network infrastructure device or 
telemetry collector is potentially compromised).   
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